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THE FREEMAN PAMPHLETS

“WHERE IRON IS, THERE IS
THE FATHERLAND!”

by

CLARENCE K. STREIT

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that sector. Just a few miles behind them they knew the French iron mines and smelters were working at top speed for the production of raw material for war munitions. And they could look over the German lines into that part of France held by the enemy and into Lorraine and see the iron mines and smelters there at work for the production of shells that they suspected were destined for them. And on the front which separated the producers of munitions for friend and foe reigned quiet.

The vital relation of iron, the basis of war munitions, to success in a modern war is so generally known that a glance at a mineral map and at statistics of France and Germany will immediately demonstrate to any one the supreme strategical importance of this quiet sector. The principal iron mines and smelters of both powers were situated close to that front. From the province of Lorraine, then a part of Germany, in 1913 came 29,000,000 of the 36,000,000 tons of iron ore produced in that country — 80 per cent. of her entire production. From the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle, separated from Lorraine only by the boundary of 1871, came 19,813,572 of the 21,500,000 tons of iron ore produced in France in 1913, or 92 per cent. of her entire production.

Now, the German Lorraine iron district extended across the political frontier, forming in France what is known as the Basin of Briey. From this small basin, which is in the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle, came 75 per cent. of the iron ore mined in that department, and 70 per cent. of all the iron ore produced in France.


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
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
When the war broke out in 1914, the Germans immediately invaded this Briey basin, and, encountering no resistance, seized possession of it. They remained in control of it to the end of the war. It was not until the Americans launched an offensive in the direction of Briey late in 1918 that the Allies threatened the German possession of the basin which produced before the war 70 per cent. of the iron ore of France. Previous to that time the Germans for at least twenty-seven months of the war had exploited with remarkable immunity not only their own iron district of Lorraine but also the French Basin of Briey, which was even closer to the front, being not twenty-five miles distant from the trenches. For this was the quiet sector of the front.

There can be no doubt as to the immense importance to the Germans of the possession of Briey. Before the war, Germany imported 14,000,000 tons of iron ore each year. Before 1913, France stood third in furnishing this mineral to Germany. That year France passed Spain and stood second, exporting to Germany 3,811,000 tons from the Briey basin, only 700,000 tons less than the amount which Germany imported from Sweden that year.


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*“Where Iron is, there
is the fatherland!”*



Scale 9 miles to 1 inch

*“Where Iron is, there
is the fatherland!”*

A NOTE ON THE RELATION OF PRIVILEGE AND MONOPOLY TO WAR

By Clarence K. Streit



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“ It is only for the poor devils that war is not a gentleman’s agreement.”
—PIERRE RENAUDEL, French Deputy.

“ I formally accuse the big cosmopolitan banks, at least the owners of mining rights, of having conceived, prepared and let loose this horrible tragedy with the monstrous thought of world stock-jobbing. I accuse these same money powers of having, before and since the war, betrayed the interests of France.”— Senator GAUDIN DE VILLAIN (Conservative).





“WHERE IRON IS, THERE IS THE FATHERLAND!”

THE BASIN OF BRIEY

WHEN American troops first went into the front line trenches in France they were given the quietest sectors on the western front.

“Not a man had been killed in that part of the front since the war began, the French troops whom we relieved told us.”

“At one place along that front there was a little wine-shop out in No Man’s Land. We used to patronize it during the day while the Boches would get their liquor there at night.”

These are typical of statements made by Yank officers and men who got their trench training in that sector.

As every one knows, this area whose quiet conditions made it suitable for the training of new troops to trench life was along the Lorraine front. Few people in the United States, it seems, have been curious enough to ask why this particular part of the western front should have been so quiet. But not so in France where the importance of this region is much more widely known than it is in this country. A few months after the war began the tranquillity of the Lorraine front aroused discussion in the press whose warmth, dampened considerably by a vigilant censor, has since the war brought about a long debate in the French Chamber of Deputies, followed by an official investigation by a committee of the parliament.

It must be said also that the quietness of the Lorraine front puzzled some of the American soldiers who were in

that sector. Just a few miles behind them they knew the French iron mines and smelters were working at top speed for the production of raw material for war munitions. And they could look over the German lines into that part of France held by the enemy and into Lorraine and see the iron mines and smelters there at work for the production of shells that they suspected were destined for them. And on the front which separated the producers of munitions for friend and foe reigned quiet.

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ment of the iron mining and smelting industry in the Basin of Briey.

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The war enormously increased Germany's need for iron ore as she had to produce munitions, not only for her own armies but also for her allies. And then the British blockade cut off her usual supply from Spain. Francis Laur, author of the book, "La France, Reine de Fer" (France, the Queen of Iron), in a letter to a daily newspaper of Paris, *L'Œuvre*, published May 9, 1916, cited official figures published by the Union of German Iron Industries which showed that the production of cast iron in Germany dropped from 1,561,944 tons in July, 1914, to 587,661 tons in August of that year. But in October, 1914, the production began to increase steadily, until in August, 1915, it had reached the total of 1,050,610 tons — only 500,000 tons less than it had been before the war when Germany had had to import

44 per cent. of her iron ore from Sweden, France and Spain.

What was the cause of this increased production, despite the blockade? For one thing, the war had given Germany control of the French iron basin of Briey from which she had imported, in 1913, 3,811,000 tons of ore. How much iron did Germany get from Briey during the war? According to a statement made on the floor of the French Chamber of Deputies on Feb. 14, 1919, by Mr. Loucheur, a munition maker, who during the latter part of the war was Minister of Munitions and who since the armistice has been Minister of Industrial Reorganization, the Germans, by their exploitation of the Briey basin during the war, took 14,000,000 tons of iron ore from its mines, only a little less than they would have imported from it in normal times of peace.

The Germans themselves during the war fully realized how important to them was the possession and exploitation of the Basin of Briey. Here is an extract from a confidential memorandum, addressed in May, 1915, to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg by the six great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany:

“If the production of raw iron and steel had not been doubled since the month of August, the continuation of the war would have been impossible. . . . As raw material for the fabrication of these quantities of raw iron and steel, the ore of Lorraine takes a place of more and more importance. From this ore at present from 60 to 80 per cent. of our raw iron and steel is made. If the production of the Lorraine ore was disturbed, the war would be practically lost.”

In referring to “Lorraine ore” the Germans included both the mineral of Lorraine proper and that of Briey, for the two regions, geologically, form one basin. The memorandum goes on to say, with regard to peace terms:

“If the fortress of Longwy should be returned to the French with the numerous blast furnaces of that region, and if a new war should break out, the German blast fur-

naces near there would be demolished in a few hours by a few long range cannons.

“A glance at the map shows that, for instance, the mine of Jarny (in the Briey basin) is 35 kilometers (about 20 miles) from Verdun and that the mineral concession the farthest west of Landres and Conflans begin, at the most, only 15 miles from Verdun. Does any one really believe that the French, in another war, would neglect to place long range artillery at Longwy and at Verdun and by such carelessness permit us to continue to extract our iron ore?”

“The security of the German empire demands then, imperiously, the possession of all the iron mines of the Lorraine basin, with the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, without which this region cannot be defended.”

It will be recalled that the famous offensive of the Crown Prince's armies against the French fortress of Verdun was launched the next year. Various reasons have been advanced as to the purpose of this tremendous effort. According to Hindenburg's version, Verdun was attacked in order to prevent the French from striking at the Basin of Briey—the Achilles' heel of the German front, which was but 20 miles east of the fortress. Here is the official German communique for October 27, 1916:

“Verdun, in the case of an allied offensive, would have facilitated the re-capture of the mineral Basin of Briey which is so precious to us, and would have resulted in menacing the fortress of Metz, the taking of which would have permitted the conquest of the industrial and mining regions of German Lorraine, thus depriving us of the most vital part of our war industry.”

In December, 1916, the *Popular Gazette* of Cologne, writing on war aims, declared: “The narrow band of territory of the Briey basin is important to guarantee our military and economic independence, especially in time of war. We have need of Briey to assure us our necessary supply of mineral, and we have the right and the duty to demand it during the peace negotiations.”

Then Dr. Schenkler of the Sarrebruck Chamber of Commerce wrote a long study of the Basin of Briey which was published in the Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger*, Feb. 13 and 25 and March 4, 1917, in which, after pointing out that before the war Germany imported 44 per cent. of her iron ore and that since the war imports from Spain had been reduced to nothing and Sweden had been unable to furnish her usual 28.55 per cent. of the normal German importations, he went on to say:

“And so it must be regarded as extraordinary good luck that Germany since the beginning of the war has been in possession of the Basin of Briey, for without the French mineral the German industry would have found it impossible to make munitions enough for ourselves and allies. Naturally, that which has been an advantage for us has been on the contrary a disadvantage for France.”

Finally, in 1918, the Allies began an offensive against Briey. And here is order No. 10,519 of the Fifth German Army, dated Oct. 1, 1918, and signed by General Von Der Marwitz:

“After information which we possess, the enemy is going to attack the Fifth Army to the east of the Meuse and try to push on toward Longuyon. The aim of this attack is to cut the Longuyon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the West. What is more, the enemy intends to make it impossible for us to exploit the Basin of Briey on which depends, in large measure, our production of steel. And so once more it is on the Fifth Army that falls the heaviest task during the course of the fighting during the next few weeks. It is upon it that the security of the fatherland reposes. It is upon the immovable resistance of the Verdun front that the fate of a great part of the western front, and perhaps the fate of our people, depends.”

These citations show how vital to German success in the war the Germans themselves considered the control of the Basin of Briey. That the French Government realized the



H. H. H.

L'Œuvre, Jan. 31, 1919.

“What a pity there was no iron ore in this region!”

(Before the Ruins of Rheims)

importance of this region is shown by the *Bulletin des Armées*, published Dec. 6, 1916, by the minister of war, which said: "The Basin of Briey appears to constitute for our enemies a precious reserve. It is indeed impossible not to be struck by the fact that the quantity of mineral imported by Germany from foreign countries before the war represents just about the amount which the Basin of Briey was then furnishing to us."

That General Pershing's staff was cognizant of the strategic value of Briey may be seen from a conversation which I had at Chaumont, April 14, 1919, with Brigadier General Conner, chief of the section of the American General Staff which had charge of military operations during the war.

"Is it true," I asked him, "that this district of Briey which the Germans held was so important to Germany for munitions that she could not have lasted for six months had the Allies taken it?" He replied:

"I don't know about the six months' limit, but the capture of it would have sounded the doom of Germany."

It is evident from these quotations that the Germans, the French and the Americans all realized the tremendous importance of the Briey iron basin during the war. And yet the astounding fact remains that until the American offensive in the last month of the war this vital sector of the western front was the one noted for its continued tranquillity. Why?

"WHERE IRON IS, THERE IS THE FATHERLAND!"

Before attempting to take up in detail the question of why the Lorraine front was so quiet during the war, it is necessary for a good understanding of the problem to outline more fully the iron industry in German and French Lorraine. As has already been pointed out, before the war most of the iron mines and smelters of these two powers were in the Lorraine basin, on both sides of the frontier. Now, some of the French iron masters owned mining concessions and smelters in German Lorraine as well as in

France, and the Germans had heavy interests in French Briey as well as in Lorraine proper.

The De Wendel family, for instance, owned one single property of 9,000 hectares (about 22,500 acres) of iron mining land, right on the boundary line, about half of it in French Briey and the remainder in German Lorraine. At Joeuf in the French Basin of Briey the family, with the Creusot interests — the Krupps of France — owned eight blast furnaces and also iron mines producing nearly a million tons a year. On the German side of the line, the De Wendel family owned mining concessions at Moyeuve and Hayange, producing 3,000,000 tons of iron ore a year and also the blast furnaces and smelters established near these mines. The political boundary of 1871 separated the property, but underground tunnels connected the De Wendel mines on both sides of the line. As the total area, in both Germany and France, of this district which produced "minette," as this particular iron ore is termed, was approximately 72,000 hectares it will be noted that the De Wendels controlled one eighth of the entire basin.

And of what nationality is this De Wendel family? It claims to be French. One member of the family, François de Wendel, is president of the Comité des Forges (the Committee of Forges) — the official name of the French iron and steel combine. During the war, he was a conservative member of the French Chamber of Deputies, representing the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. His brother, Charles de Wendel, was a naturalized German and a member of the German Reichstag. He resigned, however, when the war broke out, and returned to France where he offered his services to the Minister of War, who did not make use of them.

On the German side, the steel magnate, Thyssen, in 1909 confided to Mr. Le Chatelier his intention of having one of his sons become a naturalized Frenchman. Here is the way Le Chatelier tells it in his book, "Metallurgy of Yesterday and Tomorrow" (*Metallurgie d'hier et de demain*):

“For what reason did Mr. Thyssen wish to make us a gift of one of his sons? Simply because he was going to do us the honor of installing himself in Normandy in order to exploit our iron mines, and followed the classic adage — ‘Where iron is, there is the fatherland.’”

But Thyssen had little need of such measures to protect his interests, events of the war would seem to show. In *L'Œuvre* of Paris of May 22, 1917, Gustave Téry, the editor, declared that in the minutes of the general meeting held March 14, 1916, by the blast furnace and steel mill corporation of Caen, originally published in the financial journal, *L'Information*, March 18, 1916, “it is specified that the Thyssen interests are carefully reserved in the new organization. It is understood that a part of the profits realized by this company in the making of war munitions (for France) will be put aside for the Thyssen group, and that after the war, automatically and legally, the Messrs. Thyssen will receive this large sum. As it is certain that those same Thyssens work also for the war in Germany, these interesting metallurgists receive their profits then with both hands, that is, from the two sides of the frontier, from furnishing material to Germany and to France. If money has no odor, steel has no fatherland.”

And on Nov. 21, 1916, Téry ran this question in big type on the front page of *L'Œuvre* — a question that has yet to be answered:

“Whom do the Germans pay for the mineral they are extracting from the French mines in Briey?”

In all, the Germans owned eighteen mineral concessions in the Briey and Longwy basins, and a few more in Normandy. The Thyssens controlled the mines of Bailly, Jouaville and Souigny. The mines of Moutiers and of Conflans were dominated by an international group, the stock being distributed in this proportion: French, 100; Germans, 70; and Belgians, 10. The German “Phönix” group — Hasper and Koesch — controlled the French mines at Jarny and at Sancy. The Gelsenkirchmer, — the enter-

prise the most considerable in the world, it is said, after the United States Steel Corporation, — which produced three times more steel than the Creusots,—owned in France the mines of Saint-Pierremont, Sevey, Haut-Lay, Saint-Jean, Sainte-Barbe, Crusne and Vallerupt. Other German iron masters owned the mines of Murville and Valleroy. All of these concessions were in the Basin of Briey, with the exception of those of Sancy, Crusnos and Vallerupt which were in the adjoining French Basin of Longwy. From these properties the Germans drew from four to five million tons of iron ore each year before the war, and in addition they purchased from the two districts of Briey and Longwy more than three million tons annually.

That fact that France, rich in iron ore, was poor in coal, while Germany had plenty of coal in the Sarre basin with which to treat her minerals, accounts in part for this internationalization of the steel industry. It is interesting to note in this connection how the German, Roechling, a sworn enemy of France, arrested as soon as Lorraine was occupied after the armistice, was able to get a foothold in the Briey district before the war. The Longwy steel corporation, which owned most of the 18,000 shares in the mines of Valleroy, traded 8,000 of these shares to Roechling for 250 shares in the Carl Alexander coal mine at Roeswler, Germany, of which there were in all 1,000 shares. Roechling was the biggest individual share-holder in the Valleroy mines, while the French company held only a quarter interest in the German coal property as a result of the trade.

Not only did the shortage of coal in France contribute to internationalization, but so also did several other factors. Germany was a country "on the make." Her business was expanding rapidly, pushed by the initiative and enterprise of the German industrial leaders. They needed more iron ore — France had plenty, and what was more natural than to go to that country for the mineral. Especially since the French mining and steel combine followed a policy

of economic malthusianism, endeavoring to keep the supply down so that prices would remain high.

In each of the European countries the mineral interests were tending at a rapid rate, as in the United States, toward combination, centralization and internationalization. Above them all was the famous international banking family of the Rothschilds, Jews by religion, barons of Germany, England, France and Austria by business. And in the international Rothschild group when the war began, 210 shares were held by the Krupps.

In Germany there had risen in the mineral world the Metallurgische Gesellschaft, or Metallgesellschaft. According to Professor Liefman-Lumonde of Fribourg-en-Brigsau, this enterprise had founded the mineral company of Liège, the auxiliary company of mines at Paris, the copper and pyrite company; controlled, through the American Metal company, the nickel company, and controlled the French aluminum company and the lead industry. In addition, it had infiltrated into a great number of other companies. It was a world power.

Mr. Hughes, prime minister of Australia, speaking in London in 1918, declared:

“It is truly a tragic, menacing and threatening thing, that here, in this city, in the heart of the empire, there exists an oil agency which is at bottom German.

“I say then that the enemy agent here to whom I refer is the English branch of one of the most powerful corporations the world has ever seen, a combination, an octopus whose tentacles extended, before the war, over the entire world and whose heart was on the Main at Frankfort.

“It is an organization which had its outposts everywhere in the world, which affected not only the commercial and industrial life of the world but also its political life, which worked incessantly for the commercial profit of Germany, which reaped enormous profits to the benefit of Germany.

“It is called the Metallurgische Gesellschaft; the American Metallurgy company; The Australian Metallurgy com-

pany; the African Metallurgy company; and finally, in Switzerland, the Schweizerische Gesellschaft, a double name, sometimes German, sometimes French, sometimes in another language, but at bottom, it is always German.

“ I accuse here only the Metallurgische Gesellschaft, the great German octopus which dominated the world, which remained here during four years of war, which remains here after the war and which, I repeat, ought not to remain here one hour longer.”

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

The French iron and steel industries have, as elsewhere, tended during the last generation toward combination and centralization. In 1875 there were 383 iron smelters in France; in 1912 there were only 208, although during that period the production of iron and steel had quintupled, going from 900,000 tons to 4,900,000 tons a year. The average capacity of a smelter in 1875 was 2,350 tons and in 1912 it was 21,700 tons. The industry was also concentrated geographically. In 1875 the production was scattered over 57 departments of France. As we have seen, when the war broke out, 92 per cent. of French iron ore was taken from the single department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. What is more, 75 per cent. of French cast iron was produced in this same department, and 75 per cent. of the steel in it and the department of the Nord, on the Belgian frontier.

The great French steel foundries possessed their own iron mines which they themselves exploited. And they were seeking to own and operate mines to supply them with the coal they needed.

The Comité des Forges (Committee of Forges, or more freely, association of iron masters), was organized first in 1864. Twenty years later, in 1884, it was reorganized. Its aim, according to its charter, was exclusively “the study and defence of the economic, industrial and commercial interests of the iron industry.”

When the war began, the combine had 252 members, rep-

representing 97 per cent. of the French iron industry, 93 per cent. of the steel industry and a total capital of \$230,000,000. Its personnel numbered 200,000 workmen whose pay for 1912 amounted to a total of 400,000,000 francs, an average of \$400 a year for each employé.

But, of the 252 members of the association, 14 furnished about three-fifths of the French cast iron and two-thirds of the steel. The Aciéries de la Marine and Denain et Anzin were the leading producers of cast iron and steel, respectively, with De Wendel et Cie second in both industries. The big munition plant of Schneider et Cie stands seventh on the list for production. The board of directors of the iron and steel combine has 28 members, representing the big firms. The honorary president is Eugene Schneider. The president is François de Wendel and the secretary, Robert Pinot.

Subsidiary committees and associations have been organized in the last 20 years for the makers of such specialties as steel rails, armor plate, munitions, etc. Together they form part of a broader federation, "L'Union des Industries Metallurgiques et Minières" (The Union of the Metallurgical and Mining Industries).

MONOPOLY

Juxtaposed to the industrial organization is a commercial association, whose functioning, though in form independent, is in fact more or less solidly connected through interlocking directorates with the Committee of Forges. These associations, called "comptoirs," are formed for the sale of specific products. The Metallurgical Comptoir of Longwy, for instance, sold only crude castings. When a comptoir is organized the productive capacity of each plant holding membership in it is determined and orders are then pro-rated. All orders for steel and iron must pass through the comptoirs. Through this tight commercial and industrial organization, the Committee of Forges has virtually an absolute monopoly of the iron and steel business of France.

In the Chamber of Deputies, January 24, 1919, the organ-

ization was thus defined by Edouard Barthe, a Socialist deputy: "The Committee of Forges is a powerful organization which controls all the underground production and can thus impose upon French consumers the draconian prices which it is pleased to fix. It is made up of only a few adherents." He went on to point out that the most narrow connections united the war material and armor plate trusts from which independent shops and the arsenals of the state bought most of their raw materials. They have the same office address — 63 Boulevard Haussmann, Paris,— and the same general secretary, Mr. Robert Pinot, who at the same time is general secretary for the Committee of Forges, the syndicate of railway material producers, the syndicate of hydraulic power plants, and finally of the confederation which united all of these combines, the Union of the Metallurgical and Mining Industries.

GOLD AND IRON

If one considers that all of these trusts are not only centered in the same man at the same address but that in addition behind each of the great steel and iron enterprises are one or two great banks — L'Union Parisienne behind Creusot (the munition maker), the Credit Lyonnais behind the Aciéries de la Marine, the Comptoir d'Escompte behind the Chantiers de la Méditerranée, etc.— it will be seen what deep roots the industry of war has made in the entire economic organization of France and on what formidable allies it can count.

What was the policy of the Committee of Forges in the years preceding the war? Sheltered by a tariff which Deputy George Chaulet declared was "not only protective but prohibitive," the combine, according to Deputy Barthe, "practised an economic malthusianism of the sort the most dangerous for the nation. With France so well endowed — better endowed even than foreign countries for the metal industries,— it voluntarily prevented the development of our mechanical industry by practising the dumping with raw

material which the Germans practised with manufactured products; and so effectively that the dumping of the Committee of Forges has been as effective as the German dumping in ruining French industry and developing the prosperity of German industry. The Committee of Forges dumped raw material, iron and cast iron, which it sold cheaper to the Germans than to the French. Our raw materials returned to us from Germany in the form of manufactured articles."

LEAD

And now turn from iron and steel to some of the other minerals necessary in the war industries. Take lead. The Penarroya mine in Spain furnishes most of this mineral in Europe. Up to 1909 the Rothschild group controlled this mine and nearly all of the Spanish production of lead. After the Agadir incident of that year the Metallgesellschaft took control, though a member of the French Rothschild family still held membership in the council of administrators. From then on to 1914 the lead France needed for war purposes came to it from Spain by way of Germany.

NICKEL NOT CONTRABAND

Not only did the Germans control lead but also zinc, and what is truly strange and extraordinary is that, according to Deputy Barthe, the Metallgesellschaft also controlled aluminum, a mineral which is found almost entirely in French soil. What is more, the German international metal trust had almost complete control of nickel. Nearly all of the nickel of the world is possessed equally by two French firms: the blast furnaces of Nouméa and the Rothschild group. But this nickel, in great part, was under the dependence of the Metallgesellschaft for nearly all of it was smelted in Germany. Nickel, it so happens, is one of the products the most indispensable for the fabrication of steel for heavy artillery. Such steel needs 2 per cent. nickel in it.

Deputy Ballande, president and founder of the Nouméa company — the only one independent of the international

trust, represented in Europe before the war by the Metallgesellschaft — on the floor of the French Chamber, Jan. 24, 1919, urged that that body demand an explanation from the government of the fact that “there was a ship, loaded with nickel mineral, the property of the House of Krupp, which was seized by the French navy and then released under the most extraordinary conditions.”

SUBLIME INNOCENCE

Here is the incident, as reported by Senator Henry Bérenger in *Paris-Midi* in 1915:

“The 21st of last September (1914), a three-masted Norwegian boat, the *Bennesloet*, loaded with nickel sailed for Hamburg, Germany, and the 24th of September it was stopped by the French ship, *Dupetit-Thouars*, and brought to Brest. Half of its cargo had been paid in advance by Krupp. Despite the opinion of the prize court, this ship was released and directed toward Copenhagen. From where did the ship come? It came from New Caledonia, a French colony!”

The order to release the ship came from the central government. The administration explained that it was sent because the shipper of the cargo, the Mont Do company, had promised to have it unloaded in Norway, and because nickel then was not on the list of contraband. The decision served as a precedent, and, according to Senator Bérenger, a number of ships were allowed to pass, thus Oct. 6, 1914, the *Rambeau*; Oct. 12, the *Martindick*; Nov. 6, the *Tubantia*; Nov. 24, the *Beria*, and the senator follows this enumeration with an “etc.”

Nickel was not contraband. Nor was cotton nor azotic acid nor lead. Nickel and lead were not contraband of war — and the Metallgesellschaft had a monopoly of their production in Europe. But contrary to the French ruling, Deputy Barthe says: “At the same period, September 24, 1914, the English stopped a ship loaded with lead, en route for Antwerp. The shipper was an English firm, the desti-

nation was the Metallgesellschaft. The cargo was not contraband of war . . . but the English admiralty court ordered it held."

THE FRENCH TRUST FAVORS KRUPPS

Consider now the products of the hydro-electric industry of France — ferro-silicon and cyanamide, both necessary in the manufacture of munitions. The general secretary of the hydro-electric trust, it will be remembered, was Robert Pinot, the general secretary of the Committee of Forges, and its head office was at the headquarters of the Committee of Forges. This trust controlled 42,000 tons of the French output, against 7,000 tons produced by independent concerns.

Germany, which lacked waterfalls, did not have a domestic supply of ferro-silicon sufficient for its war industries. And so on Feb. 23, 1912, the French syndicate agreed to furnish Germany with the ferro-silicon it needed for its war stock.

"I have here the contract which was signed with Krupp several years before the war and by which the big cannon maker benefited by a reduction in price of 40 marks on the ton," declared Deputy Barthe on the floor of the Chamber, Jan. 24, 1919, in speaking of ferro-silicon. "What is serious, is that when the French industry treated with the constructor of German cannon, it knew that it was contracting for the production of war munitions. I will say more: It knew that it was furnishing Krupp with stock for a war that was coming. Better yet: it knew that the war would break out about 1914."

This accusation drew a statement from former Premier Viviani, who explained the case, which had come before the court of assises during his administration, in these words in the Chamber:

"The letters which had been seized at the homes of those whom I had had indicted permit one to ask if they had not negotiated with Germany, up to 1914, if my memory is exact, agreements from which it resulted:

“ 1. That ferro-silicon was delivered;

“ 2. That, on the demand of Krupp, this stock of ferro-silicon was brought to the door of his plant, so that in case of mobilization he would have almost immediate command of it;

“ 3. That the French agents of the company who were in Germany were forbidden to deliver this ferro-silicon to Russian agents, that is to say, that our allies were deprived of war materials of which they might have need;

“ 4. That there was the customary stipulation that a strike might annul the contract but that war between only two nations was not considered an annulling cause, so that, if war had existed between Germany and France alone, or between Germany and Russia, the contract would have continued in force.”

It was in these conditions that the case came before the court of assises, said Mr. Viviani, and then the advocate general dropped it. And Mr. Viviani added:

“ Although I am pleased to render homage to the Commissioner of the Government, Mr. de Meur (who represented the Administration), I regret nevertheless that the advocate general, Mr. Wattine, had the accusation abandoned. [Warm applause from all parts of the Chamber.] I know that the advocate general doesn't have to take orders and that he finds in the traditions of our jurisprudence the right to drop an accusation upon his own responsibility. I only regret that Advocate General Wattine did not exercise the right to read to the jury at any time during the session, the letters held by the prosecuting attorney so that — if no punishment seemed to him apposite — the country might have derived that desirable benefit in wartime: the placing by a magistrate of the stigma of moral shame upon those who had signed such documents.”

The correspondence to which Mr. Viviani referred was that between the Frenchman Riva-Berni, and the representatives of Krupp. Here is the analysis of the letters, as made by the Government Commissioner:

"The result was that Krupp had demanded that he be assured of a permanent stock of 1,000 tons [of ferro-silicon] in the vicinity of his mills, in view of a war which he considered was near; that Ehrensberger, the director of the house of Krupp, had specifically stated that he wished to be guaranteed in case of mobilization and in case of war. Opinion in Germany seemed to have been that a war was fatally coming in an indefinite future, but in any case, before the end of this Krupp contract, that is to say in 1916." [Letter of Riva-Berni to Rosenbaum, February 14, 1912.]

"In his letter the previous day, the 14th of February, to Hugo Koller, the same Riva-Berni had stated that in the opinion of the Germans it was thought that a European war would break out within two years (between 1912 and 1914) and that in the general mobilization Krupp would have great difficulty in getting his supplies.

"Copies of these letters were communicated to Mr. Giraud-Jordan in whose office they were found.

"Moreover, Riva-Berni did not hide at any time that he believed in the certainty of a war, and that in the memoir which he deposed, February 13, current year, on page 76, he said that, habituated to travel in Germany, he had foreseen the war for a long time, that he knew the war was near, as did all those who took the trouble to notice what was happening."

BUSINESS IS BUSINESS

Thus, this French business man who knew the war was coming none the less helped supply the Krupps with war material. According to the contract with the French trust, Krupp was to have a war stock of 1,000 tons of ferro-silicon delivered to him. *L'Usine*, the official journal of the Committee of Forges, says that Germany had need of only 2,000 tons of ferro-silicon a year. How much did the Krupps get as a result of this contract? During the two years preceding the war, up to July 28, 1914, the German

munition maker received 6,000 tons from France, 1,000 tons each year more than was normally needed. Six thousand tons of ferro-silicon is sufficient to treat 600,000 tons of steel. The Krupps wanted a "war stock." Evidently they got it.

The Frenchman, Giraud-Jordan, at whose office the above letters were found, was a prominent member of the Committee of Forges and, according to his own statement made during the war, he was "the real representative at Paris of the international group of which the Lonza was the centre."

The Lonza is a hydro-electric company with headquarters at Basel, Switzerland. Before the war Austro-German influences had gained control of the majority of its stock and placed at its head a German named Freydel. French capitalists, among them Giraud-Jordan, still retained some stock in the company. Giraud-Jordan was a member of the board of directors of this company and, during the war, it is charged he also remained a director of the Swiss company of Hafslund, whose plant was in Norway and which, as a neutral company, was selling its product to Germany.

When the war broke out the Lonza company sold its product, chiefly cyanamide, to German munition makers. The French hydro-electric trust was brought before a French court martial on the charge of having shipped 600,000 pounds of cyanamide to the Lonza company in Switzerland in January, 1915. This case brought out a strong protest from Robert Pinot, general secretary of the trust and of the Committee of Forges, and it elicited this comment from Giraud-Jordan, in a note written by him which was found in his office:

"On leaving the Committee of Forges, I indicated to Mr. Sautter that in my opinion, if the Lonza company or the companies affiliated with it are indicted, it will be necessary to make the Swiss government intervene through diplomatic channels."

The causing of a diplomatic incident between two nations

apparently was but a trifle to the international financiers during the war.

Other notes written by Giraud-Jordan indicated how the trust had used its influence to bribe experts in the case. The trust claimed that though the cyanamide had been shipped it had first been denatured, making it useless in the production of explosives. This was denied by others, but the trust was acquitted.

ACROSS THE BLOCKADE

Finally, Giraud-Jordan resigned from the Board of Directors of the Lonza company. Here is his letter, dated March 13, 1915, addressed to the Electrical Plants of the Lonza, incorporated:

“Gentlemen:

“I had at first hoped that our reciprocal relations could have continued unchanged by this terrible war. But I see today that duty forces me to reserve all my forces for business in France and obliges me to leave the companies, where my presence, in the present circumstances, could disturb my action and diminish my influence in the sphere in which they ought to be concentrated. . . .

“If, some day, international relations become better again, perhaps we can resume the collaboration which was based on times of peace.”

And the same day, this Frenchman, who resigned with such evident regret from a company controlled by and working for the Germans, wrote to a Mr. A. Vogt at Laupenstrasse 4, Berne, as follows:

“Dear Sir:

“Following the opinion of Dr. Koller (an Austrian) I have sent to the Lonza a letter of resignation of which I here include a copy. Nevertheless, I shall continue to be greatly interested in the Lonza, of which I remain the larg-

est shareholder after Mr. Wacker, and I have asked him to continue to send me through you as intermediary the documents of the council of administration, such as the minutes, reports and monthly balances, and I will be obliged to you if you will receive them as in the past and transmit them to me when you have the opportunity.

“In the same way, I am sending you in triplicate the documents of the Bozel company, and I ask you to send two copies to the Lonza, one of which should be addressed to Dr. Koller, who has asked me to continue to keep him informed of the business of our company.”

On March 15th, 1915, Vogt answered by accepting the commission.

Thus, while Giraud-Jordan resigned from the board of directors, he remained one of the largest stockholders in the Lonza company which was working for Germany. Under cover of his resignation, the French financier continued to keep in touch with the German and Austrian financiers.

HOW FRENCH METAL SUPPLIES WERE CONTROLLED

So much for the international organization of financial and mining men. Now, to return to the iron and steel situation in France after the war had begun. With the Germans in possession of the Briey basin, the French were forced to depend largely upon the small basin left in Meurthe-et-Moselle. This was not at all sufficient for her needs. The French iron and steel industry was disorganized and France was faced with the pressing need of importing raw iron and steel.

The government charged the Committee of Forges with the duty of importing 19,000 tons of metal from England each month in order to supply the French concerns. Seven months passed and not a ton had been imported by the steel combine. Its announced policy at that time, as given in a confidential circular, was opposed to the accumulation of stocks for fear that this would hurt the resumption of busi-

ness. It imported nothing from England, but some of the independent concerns, tired of waiting, on their own initiative and despite governmental restrictions, succeeded in importing steel from the British Isles.

Then the system was changed. A single purchasing agent at London was appointed by the French government. All orders for importations of iron and steel went through his hands. And who was he? Humbert de Wendel, a member of the Committee of Forges and a brother of François de Wendel. Who was the military attaché at London, detailed to check Mr. de Wendel, the purchasing agent? General de la Panouze, the brother-in-law of Mr. de Wendel.

Who was it in the ministry of munitions in France who had the duty of checking every kilogram of metal which came into the country? It was Captain Esbrayat, director of the Demachy bank, an institution of the Committee of Forges. Captain Esbrayat was mobilized in the department of munitions where he held the office of general secretary of the commission of woods and metals.

Who handled the distribution of the metal imported? A branch of the Committee of Forges, the Comptoir d'exportation — bureau of exportation. And who was the director of this bureau during a long period of the war up to Sept. 23, 1917? An under-director of the Committee of Forges, a man named Goldsberger, born in Zurich, Switzerland, the son of an industrial magnate of Berlin, Felix Goldsberger.

In the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, Feb. 1, 1919, it was admitted by De Wendel and by Loucheur, minister of industrial reorganization, that Goldsberger was of German origin, but they both maintained that he was a naturalized Swiss. Deputy Barthe declared that the French secret service had never been able to find trace of his naturalization. Goldsberger had been connected with the Committee of Forges since 1904.

Shortly after Mr. Loucheur was appointed minister of armament he gave this order, he said, on September 23, 1917:

“ I can not understand how the bureau (of exportation) has taken a foreigner for so delicate a position. It is impossible to allow this situation to continue. Consequently do what is necessary with the briefest delay and report to me.”

And it was only then that this Goldsberger, a man of undoubted German origin, was removed from the position of acting chief of the French government monopoly of metal.

PATRIOTEERS

Meanwhile, the Committee of Forges had been accused of speculation and profiteering — of having artificially raised the price of the steel it imported. The charges were referred to the Committee of Markets of the French Chamber of Deputies, late in 1915. Now, François de Wendel, the deputy, was a member of this particular committee. The different matters referred to it were apportioned among the members, each with a certain thing to investigate and report on. De Wendel pointed out that his special experience qualified him to investigate profiteering in steel better than any of the other deputies. And he was told to look into the charges which had been made and report. In the fall of 1918, after he had been elected president of the Committee of Forges, he turned the matter over to another deputy. Three years had passed — and not a report had been made by De Wendel.

It was then a member of the Committee of Forges, Humbert de Wendel, who was the sole purchasing agent of France for iron and steel in London. It was his brother-in-law and a banker of the Committee of Forges who checked him. It was a branch of the Committee of Forges, the bureau of exportation, with a Swiss of admitted German origin at its head, which distributed the metal imported by the single purchasing agent. And it was a deputy, another member of the De Wendel family, who was a member and later president of the Committee of Forges, to whom was given the investigation of the charges that the steel trust

was profiteering during the war and who kept the matter pigeon-holed for three years. And these are not all of the key positions which the Committee of Forges — the steel combine — filled during the war, as will be shown later.

THE BRIEY INVESTIGATION

Such was the geological and industrial situation with regard to iron and steel in France and Germany when the war broke out — the iron mines and steel mills of both countries grouped on the frontier which divides the two nations, a powerful trust controlling the situation on each side of the line, and Germans owning mines in France and the French owning mineral properties in Germany, with the industrial magnates of both powers working in more or less close harmony.

Now, the fact that the Briey basin from which came nearly all of France's iron was allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans at the outbreak of the war and no attempts were made to disturb their exploitation of the French mines for more than two years, during which time the French steel combine had a tight monopoly on all importations of metal into France, has given rise in France to several questions. They are, in brief:


1. Why was so much of the French mineral production concentrated in the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle, on the Lorraine boundary?

2. Since it was concentrated there, why did not the French fortify Briey?

3. Why was Briey not defended when the war broke out?

4. Why was the Lorraine front so quiet a sector on the French front? Why did not the French make an offensive in the direction of Briey or at least bomb it from airplanes?

Before attempting to answer these questions, a short résumé of how they were brought to public attention may be of some interest. According to the story told by Fernand Engerand, a Conservative deputy, in the Chamber on Feb.



Hermann

L'Œuvre of Paris, Feb. 3, 1919.

— "Never wounded, Hermann?"

— "No, I was at Briey!"

1, 1919, the Briey situation came to his notice in 1915 and in February of that year he wrote an article concerning it which was published in the *Correspondent*. He waited, but it brought no response from those in authority. As he had no connections with the General Staff, he sent a note to it by a member of the French Academy (one of the Immortals), calling attention to the importance of Briey. Still nothing was done. He called it to the attention of the staff three times — always in vain. And then he found that the staff officer who received his notes was — an iron master, mobilized on the General Staff! In despair, he lectured on the subject and wrote concerning it for *L'Echo de Paris*, a conservative, not to say reactionary, daily of Paris.

About the same time in 1915 that Engerand began his campaign, the question of Briey was taken up by Gustave Téry, editor of the liberal Paris daily, *L'Œuvre*. Later the question was given more publicity by a conservative senator, Henry Bérenger, in the daily *Paris-Midi*. In January, 1919, the Socialist Deputy, Edouard Barthe, interpellated the Government on the subject of the Briey basin and the Committee of Forges for two days, and was sustained in important parts of his charges by Deputies Engerand, Flandin and Eynac, all Conservatives, and by former Premier Viviani, a Liberal. Minister Loucheur replied for the Government on Feb. 14 and agreed to Barthe's demand that a parliamentary investigating committee be appointed to look into the matter. Most of the information given in this present article was obtained from the record in the *Journal Officiel* — the Congressional Record of France — of these debates, as the report of the investigating committee, if it has been made, has not been received here.

ENTER THE CENSOR

Two things worked against those who raised the question of Briey during the war. One was the censorship, the other, a counter-campaign in the press. As an instance of the censorship, on April 6, 1916, Gustave Téry wrote an edi-

torial in *L'Œuvre* on the Committee of Forges, entitled "Alsace-Lorraine and Metallurgy." The censor formally prohibited the publication of the article, save for the one word, "metallurgy," in the title which he did not cut out! As is usual in such cases, *L'Œuvre* went to press that morning with a blank space where the editorial was to have been printed, headed by the word "Metallurgy," which had escaped the censor's shears. Just as the press was starting, a squad of police under a government official appeared in the shop and destroyed the whole front page form, simply because of the single word "Metallurgy." The paper had to make a new front page form and was several hours late that morning with its deliveries. Such was the way the censorship worked.

Then, in June, 1916, there began in *Le Temps* a direct counter-attack against those who pointed to the strategical importance of Briey. Now, *Le Temps* is in France what *The Times* is in England and what the *New York Times* is in the United States. It is the largest and the most expensive newspaper published in Paris, costing three cents the copy while all the others sell for two cents. It is very conservative in policy and is the organ of the upper middle class and of the financial interests.

These articles in *Le Temps* were signed by Max Hoshiller. In them he ridiculed the arguments of Engerand and Téry and the others who were demanding that Briey be attacked and called their story the "legend of Briey." His first article, published June 1, 1916, began with these words:

"There are some who affirm that the Germans have installed at Briey a veritable arsenal from which they draw in profusion raw material for the fabrication of their munitions. Behold the reality in all its brutality: *To make their munitions, the Germans have no need of a single ton of iron ore from the Basin of Briey.*" [Italics in original.]

That gives the tenor of the whole series of articles. And now, who was this Max Hoshiller, whose name sounds as

French as Kelly sounds German? He was born in Odessa, Russia, the son of an Austrian father of Polish origin, and of a Russian mother. He was married to a French woman and was allowed to remain in France during the war upon presentation of a certificate of his origin by the committee of Polish volunteers. He was not a soldier during the war, although he says that he tried to enlist with the Allies.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

In an open letter to Deputy Barthe from A. Merrheim, head of the miners' union in France and one of the revolutionary French labor leaders, which was published in *Bonsoir*, Feb. 8, 1919, Merrheim stated that Hoschiller was a revolutionist and one of his close friends and that he, Merrheim, was the one who had urged Hoschiller to write the articles in *Le Temps* and had furnished him the statistics and data which he used. Merrheim believed that those who were saying that possession of Briey would end the war were deceiving the public and leading an extremely dangerous campaign.

"I explained to Hoschiller," wrote Merrheim in *Bonsoir*, "That the mineral of Briey represented a minimum part of the needs of Germany for iron ore, and that the ore received from Sweden was of a much greater indispensability to Germany in the making of munitions and special steel.

"I insisted on the enormous number of thousands of men whom one would have to sacrifice in order to retake and hold this basin, because of the fortifications of Metz which could bombard it with ease. With the figures of the production of the Briey mines, I showed him that it was with difficulty that the German production of cast iron could be reduced and that that would have no influence on the duration of the war.

"This conviction I still have today, for those who have spoken of the Basin of Briey have often confounded the richness underground with the existing production."

The war makes strange bedfellows. The publication of

these articles in the grave and conservative *Temps* by Hoschiller at the instigation of Merrheim is fully as remarkable as would be the publication in the *New York Times* of a series of articles, the purpose of which was in close harmony with the wishes of the financial interests, written by Emma Goldman at the request of Bill Haywood.

As for the statements of Hoschiller and Merrheim with regard to the value of Briey to the Germans, they are in direct opposition to the opinions expressed by the Germans themselves which I have already quoted. And in answer to Hoschiller, Deputy Engerand declared:

“It is known that at the moment this affirmative was made [that of Hoschiller quoted above] each day, and from only three of the 18 mines of Briey, 6,000 tons of mineral were being shipped into Germany. I have the written proof that the [French] iron magnates interested knew that the Germans were exploiting their mines.”

If any additional proof is needed of the falseness of Hoschiller's argument, it is supplied by Minister Loucheur, whom I have already quoted as having admitted on the floor of the Chamber, Feb. 14, 1919 — after the war was over and the French were again in possession of Briey — that the Germans took 14,000,000 tons of ore from Briey during the war. And that, he went on to say, “is the equivalent of what we exported to Germany before the war.”

When one considers the overwhelming evidence of the vital importance of Briey to the Germans, it is not strange that many Frenchmen suspected the presence of a “nigger in the woodpile” of *Le Temps*. Especially if one remembers that when the Hoschiller articles were appearing the German offensive against Verdun had been practically broken and the French general staff was considering plans for a counter-offensive. It was to Hoschiller that the Socialist Deputy Barthe had reference when he declared in the Chamber of Deputies:

“I affirm that the manoeuvres and lies of an Austrian who resided in France during the war were for the purpose of

turning away our military authorities from the project of relieving Verdun and carrying on an offensive in the direction of the Briey basin.”

ECONOMIC MALTHUSIANISM OR —?

Such were the conditions in which the question of Briey was brought to the attention of the French public. Let us now examine this question, as I have divided it, in four parts. First, why was the mineral production of France concentrated along the German frontier? The answer to that seems easy — because the mineral deposits were situated on that frontier. But listen to Deputy Engerand, who declared in the French Chamber, Feb. 1, 1919:

“It was a blunder without name and without equal to have left nearly all of our metallurgical and mineral production concentrated on one frontier and on a frontier as menaced as that of Lorraine. . . . And it was this blunder which just failed to transform our sublime victory of the Marne into a Pyrrhic victory, since our army was quickly stopped through lack of munitions, and the Government in this tragic situation could not provide it with any. There is the origin of all our metallurgical and industrial difficulties of the war, and it is a great miracle, and perhaps the greatest miracle, that we have been able to keep from succumbing to them, and have even — but at what a price! — triumphed over them. We must never lose sight of this situation when we wish to judge the men and events of that epoch. [Cries of ‘Well said! well said!’]”

“In the first place, France, before the war, was one of the richest countries in iron ore. It had iron everywhere, east, west, in the Pyrenees and in Normandy. The mills naturally are situated near the mines, since the blast furnaces consume twice as much mineral as coke. There was not a country where the metallurgical industries could have been more naturally and more easily deconcentrated than France.

“Why, then, was all of our iron and steel production, the essential elements in the national defense, left concentrated

in the east, right on the frontier, under the cannon of Metz?"

No reasons have been advanced for this dangerous concentration, except that the Committee of Forges with its policy of economic malthusianism was more concerned with the making of profits than with the developing of the mining industry throughout France so that the country might be better protected when the war which everybody — and especially the industrial magnates, as has been shown — expected finally began.

So much for that question. Now for the second: Since the iron and steel industry was allowed to be concentrated on this frontier, why was it not protected by fortifications? The Germans, it should be recalled, had heavily fortified the cities of Metz and Thionville in German Lorraine. The French, before the war, had finished fortifying the region surrounding Nancy near the Lorraine frontier. That city was never taken by the Germans during the war. Why, then, was not the region of Briey, far more important than that of Nancy, fortified? Listen again to Deputy Engerand:

"By fortifying and even simply by defending the vital point (Briey) of the frontier, we would have held under our cannon the raw material essential to German metallurgy. A long war would have been rendered impossible for Germany. The German metallurgists have themselves many times recognized this fact; they have declared that if we had guarded this corner of the frontier, the war would have been finished in six months with the defeat of Germany."

WHEN IS A FORT NOT A FORT?

It has been argued that the treaty of Frankfort which ended the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 prohibited the French from building any new forts along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. If that is so, how were the French able to fortify Nancy? It is almost as close to the frontier as is Briey. And if Nancy, why not Briey?

But fortifications are of little use in modern warfare, some argue. Yet the heavily fortified cities of Verdun and Nancy held out in spite of all attack. And if fortifications are of so little value, why was the presence of the fortifications at Metz used so often as an excuse for not making an offensive in the direction of Briey?

In the old defensive military plan of General Séré de Rivière the regions of Briey and Nancy were to be abandoned at the outbreak of hostilities, for reasons of foreign policy. But at that time, in 1875, the value of the mineral in the Briey basin was not known and the mining industry had not been installed there. Representatives of the French staff say that it was ignorant of the economic importance of the basin. This some generals deny, saying that they realized the strategic value of iron in war. But even so, the Committee of Forges and the government bureau of mines knew the vital relation of the basin to the making of war munitions. Why didn't they inform the government and the general staff? There is no record of their having done this.

The answers to these two questions remain clouded in obscurity. Turn, then, from this ante-bellum period, and consider the third question: When the war began, why was not some attempt made by the French troops to defend the Briey basin? Here is what Deputy Engerand has to say with regard to it:

“This part of the frontier where lay the soul of our mineral industry was open. It was without defense, it was abandoned without a fight. The region of Briey before the war was outside the zone of defense. There was only a battalion of chasseurs (infantry) installed there, and that was not done until 1913, if I am not mistaken. This battalion had its orders to fall back at the first alarm. It seems established that the abandonment of Briey was part of the plan of operation of our general staff.

“It is necessary to tell the truth and it is perfectly untrue to pretend — I see Monsieur Viviani at his bench and he will refute my statement if I am wrong — that it was the

decision taken by the government the 30th of July, 1914, ordering our troops to drop back 10 kilometers from the frontier, which caused Briey to be abandoned. No! The abandonment of Briey had been decided upon before.

"It seems to me beyond doubt that our general staff had not been informed on the economic importance of this corner of Briey and that it did not know what a strategic trump card it constituted for France.

"The German general staff, however, knew its importance, and two days before the declaration of war, it occupied the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; one day before the declaration of war, it occupied Briey and the important points in the basin. It realized that here was the feeble point in Germany, the weakness in her armor. Indeed, it was here that Germany found all of her mineral."

SANS PEUR ET SANS REPROCHE

Viviani, who was premier of France when the war started, addressed the Chamber at the close of Engerand's speech, Feb. 1, 1919, and in an eloquent explanation of his policy during that epoch, said that the Government for the diplomatic reason of proving to the world that France was not the aggressor had ordered its troops to drop back 10 kilometers (8 miles) all along the German frontier. The plan of the French general staff, he declared, was to have these troops retire 25 kilometers from the frontier, so that the Government's order really saved 15 kilometers which the staff would have abandoned.

As Briey is very close to the frontier this order gave the whole of the region to the Germans without a fight. Thus it was that the Germans came into possession of it.

Then, when the war changed from one of movement to one of position and both sides dug themselves in and settled down to a war of attrition and of munitions, it was noted by soldiers and civilians that Germany was getting from the Lorraine basin — from French Briey as well as the German side — most of the iron necessary for her war industries,

and the fourth question arose: Why did this sector of all sectors remain so quiet? Why was no offensive made in the direction of Briey? Why was not some effort made to disturb the exploitation of these mines by bombing them from airplanes?

It seems obvious that in a war of munitions all possible means should have been taken to prevent the enemy from producing iron, especially when their iron district—the Briey-Thionville basin—was within easy reach. But this was not done.

Deputy Engerand went so far as to say on May 2, 1916, in *L'Œuvre*: "The war would have been finished at one stroke if, at the beginning, we had made in this region (Briey) an advance of 7 kilometers on a front of 15. We would have cut Germany from her mineral and she could not have procured it elsewhere."

Why did not the French make an offensive in the direction of Briey? I asked General Conner, Pershing's chief of staff for military operations, that question.

"They never had the numerical superiority to undertake an offensive there," he answered.

"A greater numerical superiority was needed, then, for an attack on Lorraine than for one at the Chemin des Dames?"

"No." At that point, our conversation was unfortunately interrupted.

THE AGREEMENT FOR A LORRAINE OFFENSIVE

Now, as Major General Verraux, who commanded the 42nd Division of the French Second Army on the Briey front when the war began, pointed out in an article in *L'Œuvre*, Feb. 16, 1919, the French general staff tried its fortune with offensives a little everywhere along the western front—Champagne, the Vosges, the central part of the Woivre, the Argonne, the Artois—*except in the region of Briey*. And this remarkable exception made him ask, "Why?"—a question which he was unable to answer. He went on to say, however, that on various occasions the

officers from his army in liaison with the general staff had called to its attention the feasibility of an offensive against Briey.

General Sarrail, who was in command of this Second Army on the Lorraine front in 1914, had, indeed, projected an offensive in the direction of Spincourt-Longuyon-Longwy, the success of which would have given the French possession of the Briey basin, or at least would have made difficult if not impossible the exploitation of the Lorraine mines. But General Sarrail, as General Verraux remarks, was not in the good graces of the general staff. When the plan was submitted, the staff sent back a voluminous refutation, based chiefly on the argument that it was impossible to manoeuvre in this region. This difficulty, however, had not prevented the Germans from advancing 14 kilometers in two days in this district. The upshot of it all was that the projected offensive never materialized and on January 3, 1915, General Sarrail was replaced by General Gerard. And the iron mining Basin of Briey remained in tranquillity.

It is urged by some that the fortifications of Metz made it impossible to capture Briey by an offensive. That may or may not be true. French military authorities differ with regard to this subject.

But, as General Verraux says, whether the offensive resulted in the capture of Briey or not, such activity in that sector would have had the vital effect of so disturbing and disorganizing the work behind the German lines that it would have been impossible for the Germans to continue their exploitation not only of Briey but also of a large part of the Lorraine mines and smelters across the frontier.

General Malleterre, who commanded a brigade along this Briey front in 1914 and has the distinction, notable for an officer of his rank, of having been badly wounded in action, made this comment in *Le Temps*, January 31, 1917: "Perhaps it was thought dangerous to begin a premature and uncertain battle in these industrial regions, resulting in their immediate destruction. This destruction certainly

would have been better than to leave them to be exploited by the Germans."

Even if it be conceded that an offensive against Briey was wholly impracticable, there remained still another method by which the French could have disturbed the German exploitation of the Briey and Lorraine mines and smelters. What is more, with very little injury to the mines themselves their production of ore for the Germans could have been cut almost to nil. That statement is made on the authority of the president of the Committee of Forges, Deputy François de Wendel, himself. The method? — Bombing the mines very frequently from airplanes.

After having denied in the Chamber of Deputies on Feb. 1, 1919, that because of his interests on the Lorraine frontier he had ever intervened to prevent either an offensive against Briey or the bombardment of the district, de Wendel declared:

"On the contrary, I will say that it was I, myself, who, by my own hand, pointed out on the maps and plans of mines and smelters, in particular of those I direct, the vital points which should be hit by bombardment.

"This bombardment," he added, "was evidently possible, but could it attain the results which certain ones hoped from it?" And he went on to say that the occupation of Briey after the armistice showed that the mines and smelters there had suffered little damage from the bombardments which they did receive late in the war. And then he said:

"I do not want any one to deduce from my words that I am opposed to these bombing expeditions. I say, on the contrary, that they have rendered great service, and in particular I wish to point out, because I was able to notice the effects in Lorraine, that they obtained important results in the disorganization of the exploitation of the basin by the use of the system of one of our colleagues, Mr. Laurent Eynac. He told us, you remember, that bombardments from time to time by powerful squadrons did not give the results expected and that, if we substituted for them nightly bom-

bardments multiplied at frequent intervals, we could completely disorganize work and render it practically impossible.

"This result has been obtained. . . . I myself, a few weeks before the speech by Mr. Laurent Eynac, received through a repatriated citizen a communication from the director of one of our establishments in Lorraine in which he told me of the negative result of the heavy bombardments and pointed out the disorder and inquietude into which the workmen were thrown by the frequently repeated bombing expeditions. That was the system of Mr. Laurent Eynac. I hastened to give this letter to General de Castelnau and I do not hesitate to say that upon re-entering Alsace-Lorraine I found a certain pleasure in hearing this director tell me that he could notice the effect of his communiton."

BRIEY IMMUNE

The bombardments of which de Wendel speaks were made late in the war. Referring to the earlier years of the struggle, Deputy Barthe declared in the Chamber on February 1: "I have affirmed that, during the war, a general was officially reprimanded for having bombarded the district of Briey by airplanes, and that at one period of the war the military chiefs forbade the aviators to bomb this basin (Briey). Among those who, not wishing to give in to such orders because they noticed the activity of the Germans in the Briey basin, went and bombarded it, I believe some have been punished."

He was then interrupted by Deputy Flandin, a conservative who served at Verdun as an artillery officer, who stated: "During this difficult period [the latter part of 1916] we soldiers at this front often wondered why our aviation, which was so active during the battle of Verdun, had not been ordered to intervene and bombard the mines and smelters, from which arose immense clouds of smoke which we saw on clear days covering the horizon in the direction of Conflans."

And so, Deputy Flandin said, on December 23, 1916, he

went to the headquarters of General Guillaumet, commanding the Second Army, and explained the situation, giving him a detailed map of the Briey mines and smelters. A few days later he and his comrades were overjoyed to see that a squadron of the Second Army had bombarded the mines of de Wendel at Joeuf. But no other such bombardments followed. Puzzled, he returned to the army's headquarters. There the chief of staff told him that the general had been ordered to cease these operations for two reasons, which Flandin gave as follows: "Because Joeuf, it seemed, was not in the sector of the Second Army [laughter in the Chamber] and because the general staff reserved to itself alone the right to give orders of this kind to the bombing squadrons.

"I was profoundly astonished and chagrined, the more so because I knew, from what my friends in the aviation service who had bombarded Joeuf had told me, the operation had been done with relative ease, with efficacy and without losses."

Deputy Flandin then met General Lyautey who had been to the general staff headquarters and had found that the value of bombing the Briey region finally had been recognized and that 40 bombing expeditions had been sent over it between November 22, 1916 and February 19, 1917. He closed his speech with these words:

"But during 27 months the Germans were able, without being disturbed, to extract millions of tons of iron ore for their munition factories."

Aristide Briand then intervened, and said that he was premier during this period and that he and Albert Thomas, Minister of Munitions, had on several occasions brought to the attention of the general staff the importance of bombing these war industries of Germany.

The startling fact remains that for the first 27 months of the war the Briey basin was free from bombing, though, according to Deputy Laurent Eynac, who during the war was especially occupied with aviation bombing, only a few air-

planes were needed to trouble efficaciously the German exploitation of Briey. In 1917 the bombing of the district began, Deputy Flandin said. But how was this bombing carried on? Speaking of the period between February 9 and October 18, 1917, Deputy Eynac said in the Chamber on Feb. 14, 1919:

“The orders of the objectives to bombard were given to the bombing group in execution of a bombing plan, a secret document established under the direction of Lieutenant Lejeune, at that time attached to the aviation section of the group of armies of the East. This plan received the approbation of the Grand General Staff. Frequently in telephone messages or in visits to the bombing squadrons, Lieutenant Lejeune, who indicated the objectives for the day or for the moment, repeated the order prohibiting the aviators to attack certain objectives situated within the blockaded railroad lines.” [Exclamations in the Chamber.]

Now, who was this Lieutenant Lejeune, who had the direction of the bombing operations against Briey when they finally were begun? According to Deputy de Wendel's own admission, Lejeune was an employé of the Committee of Forges.

Always, it would seem, when iron and steel are concerned, the strategical positions, be they governmental or military, are filled by this same source, the Committee of Forges.

GERMANY RECIPROCATES

Such, then, is the mystery of the iron Basin of Briey, but it should not be considered alone. Coal is fully as important to a nation at war as is iron, and if France delayed to attack the Lorraine iron basin, Germany on the other hand made little attempt, it seems, to disturb the exploitation by the French of their coal mines in the Basin of Bruay in the department of Pas-de-Calais. In a letter published in *L'Information*, the Paris financial journal, February 16, 1919, credited to Major de Grandmaison, a Conservative

member of the Chamber of Deputies, the significance of this coal basin is made clear in these words:

“Indeed, our coal mines in that part of Pas-de-Calais which was not invaded and which remained unhurt, produced 28,000 tons of coal a day, indispensable to our railways and war industries, particularly during the active submarine campaign. The Germans on their side could ask their government: ‘Why were not Bruay and the coal mines bombarded and destroyed? Why, instead of attempting an unfruitful effort against Verdun in February, 1916, didn’t you make the same effort toward the coal basin of Pas-de-Calais?’ They surely could have pierced our lines, since at that time the second and third trenches had not been dug.

“It can be said today that the truly remarkable activity of our coal mines of Pas-de-Calais and the willingness of our miners working day and night, in proximity to the enemy lines during the most critical hours of the war, have *contributed to save France from defeat*.

“One can conclude that if our military chiefs and men in power have committed a few errors in the conduct of the war, our enemies have committed *much greater ones* and that their having respected to the very end of the war the uninvaded section of the coal mining district of Pas-de-Calais was not the least among these errors.” [Italics in original.]

This same point was brought out by François de Wendel, head of the Committee of Forges, during the debates in the Chamber of Deputies on February 1, 1919, when he said: “If it was so easy by bombarding the mines of Briey to obtain the results that we hoped for, one can not conceive why the Germans, who knew our coal situation and realized in what difficulties we would have been thrown by the destruction of the mines of Pas-de-Calais, did not destroy them. For these mines of Pas-de-Calais were not 25 or 30 kilometers [15 to 20 miles] from the front as were those of Briey, but simply 15 or 17 kilometers.”

This remark made by the president of the steel combine

drew from Gustave Téry in *L'Œuvre*, February 7, 1919, the following comment: "It is, indeed, inconceivable. What! The Boches who bombarded Paris 120 kilometers distant could not reach French Bruay which was only 15 kilometers from their lines? At the moment that I asked myself that question — and it was not the first time that it had come to me — I heard behind me a colleague ejaculate, 'By George! They were in cahoots!' And it made me shiver."

Shortly afterwards, *Le Matin*, a conservative French daily with a circulation said to be over a million and a half a day, printed on its front page, February 14, 1919, a two column headline which read:

WHY WAS NOT BRIEY BOMBARDED?

Le Matin adds today to the debate the point of view of the French high command.

Up to this time *Le Matin* had been "playing down" the debate over Briey. But under this headline it published a long letter, filling nearly a column and a half on the front page, signed "General X," which throws illuminating light on the working of the military mind. Here it is, in part:

"Why was not an attempt made to destroy the smelters of Briey, or at least prevent all work in them by bombarding them continually? Here again we must look at the question in its true setting. Despite all that may be said, *war is a matter of convention*. For centuries it has been a magnificent and terrible game between professionals. One fought according to the rules of the game.

"In this war for the first time conventions, because it was a war of nations, have been trodden under foot. . . . But some tacit convention existed nevertheless. In some sectors men could at certain hours attend to their private needs, wash themselves and go look for water without hearing a gun shot. . . .

“In the same way, the *bombardment of the staff headquarters*, when they were not on an important route or at a railhead where troops were concentrated, *was most often abstained from.*”

THE COURTEOUS GERMANS

“When Compiègne, after the 21st of March (1918), received every night visits from the enemy gothas, the palace where the Grand General Staff was installed, did not receive a bomb. The Germans bombarded the station, the bridges over the Oise, the crossroads,—*they visibly spared the staff Headquarters.*

“It should be noted that there is in these tacit conventions a point of view of general interest which well shows how in the most unreasonable enterprises, wisdom makes its voice heard.

“Now, there was much of this wisdom in the question of Briey. The Germans were exploiting the smelters in range of our aviation, but we were exploiting others fully as important in range of their artillery. As far as possible the security of the one bought the security of the others. And as everything is relative, there were not, as a matter of fact, many bombs dropped on one side or the other. There may have been a general order forbidding the bombing of the Briey smelters. But this order ought to be interpreted in this manner: ‘Let them alone and let them leave us alone.’

“Do you wish another example of this conventional state of spirit which will reign in war as long as it is carried on by soldiers of career? The armistice will furnish it. It is now asked, ‘Why was not the immediate demobilization of the German army demanded, since it was demanded of the Austrian army?’ Simply because, following the time honored rule of military dignity, any adversary who has proved his bravery and tenacity, has the right to what are called ‘the honors of war,’ — that is to say, to retire with his arms and baggages. Marshal Foch judged that the German army had merited this concession, while the Austrians, bad soldiers

that they were, had not merited it. And I tell you that not a military man has found Marshal Foch's decision wrong."

Three days later in another letter to *Le Matin*, replying to Major de Grandmaison, "General X" spoke even more plainly of the "tacit agreement" between the belligerents for the mutual protection of staff headquarters, saying:

"We have even seen that the Grand General Staff after the 21st of March, when the enemy suddenly came within 20 kilometers of it, was at Compiègne, through which troops and artillery were continually passing. And so the Germans, who had never bombarded Chantilly nor Beauvais and who later did not bombard Provins, multiplied at this time their bombing expeditions to Compiègne. *But as the palace—the headquarters of the general staff—was by its size extremely visible and sufficiently distant from the road, the bridges of the Oise and the railway station, it did not receive any projectiles.*" [Italics mine.]

The explanation of this immunity, according to "General X," was that from the military point of view, the results obtainable from bombing staff headquarters were illusory and not worth while.

"A GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT?"

It was the publication of the first of these two remarkable letters that caused Pierre Renaudel, Socialist deputy, to declare during the debate in the Chamber that day:

"It is only for the poor devils that war is not a gentlemen's agreement. Or, to put it more exactly, the only agreement which they make is a convention with death."

"Was it then a 'gentlemen's agreement,' similar to the one that protected staff headquarters, which was the cause of the remarkable immunity which the coal and iron mining districts on both sides of the western front enjoyed during most of the war? The letter in *L'Information*, already quoted, brings out this point succinctly. After referring to the complaints of French aviation officers that they had been forbidden to bomb Briey, the writer says:

“The motive of this prohibition of which the aviation officers speak seems, according to rumors, to have been due to a *tacit agreement between the belligerents*. It would seem that we said to the Germans: ‘We will not bombard Briey from which you get your iron ore if you will respect, on your side, Bruay and the coal basin of Pas-de-Calais.’” [Italics in original.]

Who, at bottom, was responsible for the undeniable immunity accorded these iron and coal mines?

The international financial and mining interests, responds Deputy Barthe, who, from the tribune of the Chamber on January 24, 1919, solemnly declared:

“I affirm that either by the fact of the international solidarity of the great metallurgy companies, or in order to safeguard private business interests our military chiefs were ordered not to bombard the establishments of the Briey basin which were being exploited by the enemy during the war.

“I affirm that our aviation service received instructions to respect the blast furnaces in which the enemy steel was being made, and that a general who had wished to bombard them was reprimanded.”


THE FLAG OF BIG BUSINESS

Gaudin de Villaine, a Conservative member of the French Senate, went a step further in his brochure, “Le Fou de roi,” (The King’s Fool), in which he cites page 18 of the French Yellow Book:

“Fabricants of cannon and armor plate, great merchants who demand the greatest markets; bankers who speculate on the age of gold and on the next indemnity, think (in Germany) that the war should be good business.”

Then he declares that the true profiteers of the war are “the producers of the metals of the world brigaded under the banner of the Metallgesellschaft of Frankfort.” He concludes:

“I formally accuse the big cosmopolitan banks, at least



Guerin, in *L'Œuvre*, Dec. 4, 1918.
“Fifty-one months!! How quickly the time flies.” . . .

the owners of mining rights, of having conceived, prepared and let loose this horrible tragedy with the monstrous thought of world stock-jobbing. I accuse these same money powers of having, before and since the war, betrayed the interests of France."

But, some will urge, it is absurd to think that the mineral magnates of France or Germany should have brought about a "tacit agreement" to protect their properties during the war. Why, everybody knows that modern wars are fought for the possession of coal and iron deposits. That's what the Franco-Prussian war was over. It may be granted that in 1871 and for a country industrially "on the make," as Germany was, such a motive may exist. And it would seem that the same motive would hold good for the French capitalists. Yet, as has been shown in this article, the flag which flies over a mining district matters but little to capital for the ownership of the mines is international. The German empire took possession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, but we have seen that French capitalists still retained their property rights in the Lorraine basin.

However obvious may seem the value to France of possession of Alsace-Lorraine, the plain fact is that to the French steel trust — the Committee of Forges — the return of these two provinces was not regarded as an unmitigated blessing. In a deposition made October 28, 1915, before a committee of the French Senate, Robert Pinot, general secretary of the Committee of Forges — and a number of other big metallurgical combines — stated:

"The return of France to the frontiers of 1915 (that is, the return of Alsace-Lorraine) would place the French metallurgical industry in an excessively critical situation, and, in addition, would aggravate very seriously the dependance of France on foreign countries for supplies of coal and coke."

PITY THE POOR STEEL TRUST

According to his figures, the addition of the Lorraine iron basin to France would force the country to import 28,000,000 tons of coal each year. But there was the German coal basin of the Sarre, which was included in France in the boundaries of 1814, and Mr. Pinot then discussed the effect of France annexing the Sarre district. He said it would reduce the coal importations 8,000,000 tons a year, but his conclusion was:

“But it must be remarked that if the general interest imperiously commands the re-annexation of the Sarre coal basin, the particular situation of the French metallurgical industry will by this fact be made even more serious.”

Why? The reason that Mr. Pinot gave was that the return to France of the Lorraine iron district would increase enormously the iron and steel production of France, and, as there were some smelters in the Sarre basin, the annexation of it would further increase this production. But why should the French mineral trust oppose this increase in production? Remember that the policy of the Committee of Forges was one of economic malthusianism — keep production down so as to keep prices up. Sheltered behind a tariff which has been described as “prohibitive,” the combine was able to keep domestic prices up as high as it pleased.

No one has better described the policy of the Committee of Forges than Abbe Wetterlé, the deputy from Alsace in the French Chamber, who declared:

“I had understood nothing in those days of the mental reservations of those who wished to deprive us of the fruit of our long and sorrowful wait. I saw their game more clearly, when, a few months later, their opposition crystallized in more precise formulas. We find before us these partisans of economic malthusianism, who, disdainful of the national wealth, preoccupy themselves uniquely with rarifying a product on the domestic market in order to sell it

more dearly. They are the representatives of the least effort who are afraid of a crisis of over-production, persons, either timorous or more often selfish to the point of forgetting patriotic duty, who consent to leave to Germany all of her formidable advance, provided that they themselves, sheltered behind a solid tariff wall on the frontier, can sell at higher prices their decreasing production."

Since it realized that even it could not come out openly against the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the Committee of Forges hit upon a happy compromise policy and called for the erection of a tariff frontier between the returned provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and the rest of France. It remains to be seen whether this boon will be granted them, but they have made a good start in that direction. They are still following their old policy of filling the strategical positions with their own henchmen. Little notice was taken in this country of the announcement of February 21, 1919, that Mr. Millerand had been appointed governor-general of Alsace-Lorraine. But in France it is known that Millerand is the attorney of the steel combine — the Committee of Forges.

BLOODY PROFITS

It will be seen from this exposure of the policy of the Committee of Forges toward the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if it has not already been sufficiently demonstrated in this article, that the interests of a nation and the interests of private property are two separate and distinct things. Whether the money and mineral international did or did not prepare and start the war, as Senator de Villaine charges, it is certain that the 51 months during which millions of men were killed was a most profitable era for these interests. The wholesale slaughter of men, it cannot be denied, means good business to those who furnish the instruments of death.

When war does not exist, these interests seek to cause it. That was shown by Liebknecht in 1913 when he ex-

posed before the German Reichstag the policy of the Krupps, which was to subsidize French newspapers at Paris to attack Germany and then use these editorial attacks to convince the Reichstag that Germany for fear of France must increase her armament.

STOCK AND BOND MORALITY

And when war does exist, we have seen what happens. The "Red" International Socialists may be forbidden to attend a Stockholm conference for the purpose of discussing peace terms. But the "Yellow" International of the financial and mineral interests is not disturbed in its working during even the time of war. Here is one last bit of evidence of that fact. When the Socialists were being denounced because of the proposed Stockholm conference, this little news dispatch was sent from Switzerland by the Havas Agency and appeared on October 29, 1917, in the columns of *Le Temps*, the Paris organ of the French moneyed interests:

"An examination of the rumors concerning the negotiations for peace, which are said to have taken place among the members of high finance from the two groups of powers has shown that the story arose simply from the meetings between financiers of the Entente and of the Central Powers for the purpose of exchanging certain stocks and bonds."

Based on the facts which have been given in this article, it is submitted that for those who own the mines and smelters, and who, despite the fact that their properties are situated in close proximity to the front, are permitted to exploit them and reap the profits from them, war is not the fearful calamity it is to the common men on the famous plains of Picardy and the fields of Flanders who by the million are slaughtered by the output of these mutually protected mines.

War, Sherman said, is hell.

But business, as Octave Mirbeau remarked, is business.

* * * * *

What, then is the conclusion to be drawn from these facts?

I can do no better than reproduce the one expressed by Gustave Téry, February 7, 1919, in *L'Œuvre*:

“No one can deny any longer the existence of the Metallurgical International. It is for the nations now to see and comprehend this fact. Consider an iron mine. Is it too much to say that those who own it control peace and war? What, in reality, is the most profitable way of handling iron ore? It is in manufacturing it into armament. It is to the interest of the maker of arms and munitions to increase armament, the excess of which inevitably provokes armed conflicts. Modern war is the natural and ever-recurring fruit of metallurgy.

“If this one truth is known today, 20,000,000 men will not have died in vain. But it must be inscribed in the minds and hearts of all the survivors. They must thoroughly understand the simple relation of this simple effect to this simple cause: Remove the sabre from whatever kaiser threatens to overrun the world; he will remain peaceful or become a laughing stock. . . . Separate man from iron and coal and he is powerless and war is impossible.

“The first article of the covenant of a true Society of Nations ought not to be a naïve appeal to fraternity nor a declaration of ‘immortal principles,’ but simply this: *Coal and iron can no longer in any country remain private property.*”

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
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